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Using a sample of data hand-collected from LinkedIn, the Article
demonstrates that référendaires are drawn from a relatively closed
social network. There is no open platform for recruiting référendaires, and the requirement of French as the working language
significantly limits the pool of eligible candidates. The inefficiency
of the référendaire labor market results in less competition, leading
many référendaires to stay longer at the Court. The revolving door
between the Court and the European Commission raises serious
conflict issues, as the Commission is able to exert influence on the
Court from the inside and gain a comparative advantage in litigation. In addition, the Court’s practice of issuing a single, collegial
decision encourages free-riding, increases pressures for judges and
référendaires to conform, and suppresses dissent, as illustrated in
the Microsoft case. Last but not least, the division of labor between
the General Court and the Court of Justice could lead to divergent
incentives for judges working at different levels of the Court.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Justice of the European Union (“the Court”)1 is
the most powerful supranational court in the world. In the political science literature the Court is often depicted as activist, constantly expanding the scope of EU law and pushing its boundaries.2 Indeed, through a series of innovative decisions in the 1960s,
the Court is said to have effectively “constitutionalized” Europe.3
Today the Court’s power and influence have extended far beyond
its founders’ original goal of unifying Europe. As regulations originating from Brussels have penetrated many aspects of economic
life,4 the Court not only delineates the fundamental rights of European citizens but also greatly influences the way multinational
companies are conducting business within and outside of Europe.
Acting as a veritable “Supreme Court” of Europe, the Court has the
authority to provide the ultimate interpretation of EU regulations
in a wide range of areas affecting global commence. Multinational
companies, ranging from European leaders like GlaxoSmithKline
and LVMH, to America’s iconic businesses such as Google and Facebook, and to China’s national champions such as Huawei and
ZTE, all need to pay heed to the Court’s rulings.
Despite this considerable global profile, we know very little
about the Court itself. Indeed, existing literature on EU law tends
1 The Court of Justice of the European Union comprises three tribunals: The
Court of Justice, the General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal. For purpose of
this article, the Court refers to the Court of Justice and the General Court.
2
See generally e.g., KAREN ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER
(2009) (analyzing the political influence of the Court); JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AT THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (Mark Dawson et al. eds., 2013) (discussing the
Court’s political role); HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE (1986) (explaining the Court’s role in judicial pro-community
policymaking in Europe).
3 See e.g., Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of A Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 24–27 (1981) (demonstrating the effect of the Court of Justice on the European Community’s legal framework); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2413–22 (1991) (discussing the transformation which occurred in the European Community’s relationship with the
individual Member States between 1958 and 1992).
4 See generally Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effects, 107 NW. U. L. J. 1 (2012) (discussing the increasingly expansive role of the Court of Justice of the European
Communities in the European judicial process).
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to view the Court as a black box and ignores one crucial element in
judicial law making—human behavior. This partly has to do with
the “faceless” nature of EU judicial law making. Since its establishment, the Court has followed the French tradition of issuing a
single, collective, and unanimous judgment without dissents. In
fact, judges are prohibited from revealing how the Court reached
its decision in a particular case.5 Another daunting challenge in
understanding the Court is the secrecy of the decision-makers
themselves. While judges’ profiles are disclosed by the Court, the
Court does not publish any information on their law clerks (officially entitled “référendaires”6). But référendaires play an important and indeed sometimes crucial role in the decision-making
process.
Despite these challenges, this Article hopes to draw a sketch of
the faces behind the Court. The project is inherently interdisciplinary and builds upon various strands of literature in law, economics, political science, and sociology. It is also both quantitative and
qualitative. Based on the public information disclosed by the
Court, I provide summary statistics of the background of the judges and advocates general (collectively referred to as “EU judges”
hereinafter) appointed by the Court since 1952. As the background
of référendaires is not disclosed, I hand-collected data from
LinkedIn, a professional social networking website, and created a
dataset of 103 former référendaires and seventy-four current référendaires working for the Court. In May 2014, I made a field trip
to Luxembourg, and during the subsequent twelve months I conducted twenty extensive interviews with former and current members and staff of the Court.7
The Article is organized as follows: Section II sets the stage by
providing a sketch of the EU judicial process. Section III delves inSee The Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, art. 2, Aug,
11, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 201, 210 (directing each Judge to “preserve the secrecy
of the deliberations of the Court”).
6 Référendaires are also referred to as “legal secretaries” in English.
7 The interviews were open-ended and conducted either face to face or over
the phone and lasted for about an hour on average. They were conducted on
condition of anonymity, and thus, interviewee’s names have been omitted from
this article.
5
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to the appointment process of EU judges and analyzes how the salary of EU judges could, in turn, influence their judicial quality.
Section IV studies the hidden decision-makers at the Court by examining the labour market, social network, country of origin, and
career structure of référendaires. It also probes into the affiliation
of some référendaires with the European Commission (“the Commission”) and explores the potential consequences. Section V analyzes how the Court’s practice of issuing a single judgment could
suppress dissent, as illustrated in the Microsoft case. Section VI
studies the unique division of labor between different levels of the
Court and analyzes how such an arrangement could influence the
incentive structure for the EU judges. Section VII concludes and
provides implications of this study. The summary statistics of the
EU judges and référendaires are presented in Section VIII.
2. HOW THE COURT WORKS
The Court is comprised of three tribunals: The Court of Justice,
the General Court, and the Civil Service Tribunal.8 Both the Court
of Justice and the General Court are composed of one judge from
each EU country.9 The Civil Service Tribunal comprises seven
judges.10 As the Civil Service Tribunal specializes in staff cases, it
is excluded for the purpose of this study. As of July 2015, there
were also nine advocates general at the Court of Justice, six of
whom are appointed from the largest EU Member States (including
Germany, France, Spain, Poland, the UK, and Italy).11 The final
8 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union, art. 19 (1), Oct.
26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 27.
9 See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, art. 253–54, Oct. 12, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 159 [hereinafter TFEU] (noting
the criteria by which judges of the General Court and Court of Justice are selected).
10 HUGO BRADY, TWELVE THINGS EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE
EUROPEAN
COURT
OF
JUSTICE
32(2014),
http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/
attachments/pdf/2014/hugo_brady_12_things_ecj_22.07.14-9313.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z2UA-SZYJ].
11 See Press Release No 139/13, Court of Justice of the European Union, Entry
into Office of New Members at the Court of Justice and the General Court (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201310/cp130139en.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7EL-L8XJ] (noting changes in the com-
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three positions rotate among the remaining EU countries.12 Similar
to judges, advocates general are also officially “members” of the
Court and indeed enjoy status equal to judges.13 However, they do
not participate in the deliberation of cases.14 Rather, they provide
an independent reasoned opinion to the Court, thus playing the
role of a quasi-decision-maker.
At each level of the Court, every judge or advocate general is
entitled to three clerks (officially entitled référendaires); some
judges who assume management responsibilities are entitled to
four référendaires.15 Judges at the Court of Justice have additional
help from administrateurs juristes, who are lawyers but do not
work on cases directly.16 According to the data provided by the
Court in March 2015, there were 123 référendaires and 22 administrateurs juristes working at the Court of Justice and 94 référendaires at the General Court.17
The Court of Justice is the highest court for the European Union, but it also acts as the Court of first instance for certain matters.
Its work falls within two main categories. The first category involves direct actions against Member States or EU institutions as
well as appeals from the General Court.18 The second category includes preliminary rulings, which are proceedings in which the
Court gives clarification to a national court when the latter is in
position of advocates general and that the court would appoint two additional
advocates by Oct. 2015).
12 Id.
13 See Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, Annual Report 2014, 67–89 (2015)
(showing that judges and advocates general are both members of the court, and
they enjoy the same status).
14 TFEU, supra note 9, at art. 252.
15 This is based on the Author’s search of the Court of Justice of the European
Union in the official directory of the European Union. EU Whoiswho, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/whoiswho/public/
(last
visited
Oct.
6,
2016)
[https://perma.cc/6EK3-HD67].
16 E-mail from Access to Documents Unit, Court of Justice of the European
Union to Author (Mar. 20, 2015, 15:30 GMT) (on file with Author) (providing data
about the référendaires and administrateur jurists).
17 Id.
18 David Edward, How the Court of Justice Works, 20 EUR. L. REV. 539, 543
(1995).
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doubt about the interpretation or validity of an EU law.19 The
work of the Court of Justice encompasses all areas of EU law, such
as constitutional cases involving free movement, fundamental
rights, tax, environment, intellectual property, competition, state
aid, and social policy. The General Court is the lower level of the
Court. It hears actions against EU institutions, though certain matters are reserved to the Court of Justice. It mainly deals with factintensive cases involving competition, state aid, trade, agriculture,
and trademarks. Cases heard at the first instance by the General
Court may be subject to appeal to the Court of Justice on points of
law only.
EU judicial law-making is a cooperative enterprise and judges
work together in a committee. At the Court of Justice there are ten
chambers, each consisting of three to five judges.20 At the General
Court there are nine chambers, each consisting of three judges.21
Certain types of important cases are reviewed by the grand chamber, which is comprised of the President, the Vice President, the
Presidents of Chambers, and a number of other judges.22 Extremely important cases are decided by a plenary session of the whole
court.23 The composition of the chambers changes periodically,
and the presidency of the chambers rotates on an annual basis.24
At the Court of Justice, the President allocates a case to one
judge as rapporteur and the First Advocate-General25 allocates it to
one advocate general (though advocates general are no longer appointed in every case due to a workload concern). The rapporteur
Id. at 544–45.
See Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, supra note 13, at 85–86 (listing the
presidents of each of the ten chambers at the Court of Justice and the order of
precedence for the judges overall).
21 See id. at 175 (listing the president of each of the nine chambers at the General Court and the order of precedence for the judges overall).
22 Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, Consolidated Version of the Rules of
Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Union [hereinafter Rules of Procedure], art. 27(1) (Sept. 25, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/
docs/application/pdf/2012-10/rp_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6A7-YRNJ].
23 Id. at art. 60(2).
24 Edward, supra note 18, at 542–43.
25 The First Advocate-General assumes a management role in deciding
whether to review certain appeals from the General Court and to allocate cases
among advocates general.
19
20
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assumes the responsibility of drafting the report of the hearing,
which is essentially a summary of the parties’ arguments, and a
preliminary report, which is purely an internal document for purposes of deliberation.26 The preliminary report summarizes the legal and factual background of the case and concludes with the personal observations and recommendations of the rapporteur judge.
The advocate general does not participate in the deliberation of the
case, and will issue his own independent opinion.27 Once the advocate general has delivered the opinion, the rapporteur then circulates a note to the other judges in the panel providing his suggestions on how the case should be handled.28
The deliberation among judges takes place behind closed doors
and référendaires are not allowed to participate in the process.29
Even if there is disagreement among the judges, the Court only issues one single judgment and no dissenting opinions are allowed.30
In reality the rapporteur and the advocate general will be most
closely involved in the case as they assume most of the drafting responsibilities. They also gain the first mover advantage in influencing other judges on the panel in how to decide the case. The
General Court largely follows a similar process, except that it has
no dedicated member serving as advocate general, and advocates
general are instead appointed on an ad hoc basis from among the
judges.
As the EU’s main executive arm, the Commission is the most
frequent party appearing in front of the Court. Since the Court’s
establishment, the Commission has served as a party in over 52%
of the cases.31 While Member States have primary responsibility
for applying EU law, the Commission monitors its application and
Edward, supra note 18, at 551–52.
Id. at 555.
28 Id.
29 Rules of Procedure, supra note 22, at art. 32.
30 Edward, supra note 18, at 555–57.
31 This data was hand-collected using the Court’s database and includes all
cases decided by the Court from its establishment to August 27, 2015. InfoCuria,
Case-law of the Court of Justice, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
recherche.jsf?language=en [https://perma.cc/WA2D-2ERA] (last visited Aug. 27,
2015).
26
27
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may bring infringement actions against Member States for noncompliance. With regard to competition cases, the Commission
acts as both the investigator and prosecutor and can bring actions
directly against individuals and companies.
3. EU JUDGES
Judges are, as Posner called them, “all-too-human workers.”32
And like other humans, judges derive their utility from maximizing the sources of their satisfaction; these include not only income
but also non-pecuniary compensation, such as prestige, power, and
leisure. However, unlike labor participants working for private
organizations, the performance of judges is largely insulated from
performance review. To be sure, judicial opinions are often subject
to criticisms, but the nature of judicial rulings will always create
winners and losers. As long as a judge does not commit gross mistakes and faithfully applies the statutes, a judge’s career will normally be secure no matter what interpretation he applies to the
statute. Indeed, the loosely-worded EU treaties provide plenty of
room for EU judges to make law. The unobservability of judicial
output could therefore lead to problems of adverse selection and
moral hazard. This, however, does not mean that EU judges are
free from any constraints. The selection process for EU judges, as
well as the incentives and constraints imposed by the structure and
rules of their careers, has a significant impact on how they behave.
As of the end of 2015, 184 men and women have served at the
Court of Justice and the General Court. Ninety-five have served as
judges. Forty-five have served as advocates general at the Court of
Justice, and sixty-six have served as judges at the General Court.
Twenty-two judges have served multiple roles at the Court. A statistical summary of the judges’ gender, education, and professional
experience is presented in Appendix I.

32

RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 7 (2008).
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3.1. Selection
As the performance of EU judges cannot be easily observed
and monitored, judicial appointment becomes of paramount importance in controlling judicial quality.33 However, judicial appointments are not made strictly on merit. While the EU prides itself on integration, there is no common market for judges. Like
many other international tribunals, candidates for judicial positions at the Court are put forward by the individual Member
States.34 Upon nomination, governments of the Member States, by
common accord, appoint the judge for a renewable term of six
years.35 In practice, Member States never disagree with each other’s nomination, so in effect each Member State appoints its own
judges.36 As a consequence, each Member State follows its own judicial appointment process, which is often opaque and political.37
As shown in Appendix I, more than 65% of the EU judges have
worked in government prior to joining the Court. In particular,
28% of the EU judges’ primary work experience and 27% of the EU
judges’ last positions before joining the Court were in government.
Noticeably, more judges at the Court of Justice (67%) have backgrounds in government than those at the General Court (57%).
Many of them have been former ministers or legal advisors at the
33 See Damian Chalmers, Judicial Performance, Membership, and Design at the
Court of Justice, in SELECTING EUROPE’S JUDGES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE
APPOINTMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN COURT 51, 55 (Michal Bobek ed., 2015) (arguing
that the lack of clear vision in the function and direction of the Court during the
judicial appointment stage results in the Court setting its own tasks for itself,
causing the judicial outcome to reflect the prevailing professional disposition of
the Court).
34 See Sally J. Kenney, Breaking the Silence: Gender Mainstreaming and the Composition of the European Court of Justice, 10 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 257, 259–60 (2002)
(describing the general method by which judges are appointed).
35 TFEU, supra note 9, at art. 253.
36 See Kenney, supra note 34 (noting that appointments are rarely a subject of
attention and states simply need to inform the council of their decision).
37 See id. at 260 (2002) (explaining the secrecy surrounding Court appointments). See also Henri de Waele, Not Quite the Bed Procrustes Built, in SELECTING
EUROPE’S JUDGES: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE APPOINTMENTS TO THE EUROPEAN
COURT, supra note 33, at 24 (analyzing the system for selecting judges at the Court
of Justice of the European Union).
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Ministry of Justice or former members of the diplomatic corps.
Some have even served in the parliaments of the nominating state.
The preference for government officials is not surprising. As the
secret deliberation rule prevents nominating states from monitoring the voting preference of their appointees, appointing governments are more prudent in choosing the candidates that they believe will act in their interests. Only 53% have prior judicial
experience in the national courts. In fact, only 17% of the EU judges’ primary work experience and 29% of the EU judges’ last positions before joining the Court were in the judiciary. But sovereign
interest is not the whole story. Kenney observes that each nominating country would need to strike their own balance of interests
in terms of political parties and languages when selecting the
“best” candidates to the Court and other supranational tribunals.38
Even if appointments are not driven by a specific policy agenda,
personal connections to the appointing executive and party credentials are deemed paramount in some Member States.39 In some
cases, the nominating state has used judicial appointment as a form
of patronage to reward loyal functionaries or as an opportunity to
remove an undesirable political opponent. 40
Worse yet, there is no public hearing during the appointment
process. The only public information the Court makes available
about the judges are their profiles. These profiles generally contain
a judge's birth year, year of entry and departure, position at the
Court, prior education background, work experience, and other
public activities. However, a closer look at these profiles reveals
that there is no mandatory disclosure rule, and many of the profiles are incomplete. Indeed, Appendix I reveals that almost 77% of
the profiles of the EU judges contain missing information about
their education background, so it is not possible to verify either
schools attended, degrees obtained, or both. 16% of profiles do not
contain sufficient information about work experience, so it is not
possible to verify their primary work experience prior to joining
Kenney, supra note 34.
Id.
40 Id. In this regard, the Court of Justice is not so different from other international tribunals. See generally Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 387 (2008) (discussing the influence that governments
exert over the decisions of international judges through the appointment process).
38
39
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the bench. Nor do we know the last positions of almost 18% of
judges based on their public profiles. In fact, 26% of EU judges
provide no information regarding their educational background
whatsoever. Over 40% of judges from Portugal, Spain, Greece,
Denmark, and the Netherlands completely omit their educational
background. An extreme example is Denmark, where five out of
seven appointees provide no disclosure of educational background. This coincides with the fact that most judges appointed
from Denmark come from the government.
Even when the profiles are complete, the information on paper
is still far from enough to gauge the judge’s qualifications for the
position. To function effectively and efficiently at the Court, EU
judges need to possess three important skills: first, knowledge of
EU Law; second, superb legal and research skills and an astute legal mind; and third, fluency in the French language.41 However,
the criteria as established in the EU Treaty are very loose.42 This
leaves considerable room for discretion.
In 2010, an expert committee (“the Committee”) was established under Article 255 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to vet the credentials of candidates nominated by the member states as well as current members who are up
for reappointment.43 The Committee is comprised of seven members, who are chosen from former EU judges as well as members of
national supreme courts and lawyers of recognized competence.44
41 See Kenney, supra note 34, at 267 (noting the threshold for merit for EU
judges). See also Iyiola Solanke, Diversity and Independence in the European Court of
Justice, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 89, 105 (2008) (addressing the need for improved diversity, independence, and additional transparency in the Court of Justice).
42 Art. 253 of the TFEU provides that “the Judges and Advocates-General of
the Court of Justice shall be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond
doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest
judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised
competence.” TFEU supra note 9, at art. 253. Art. 254 of the TFEU provides that
“the members of the General Court shall be chosen from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the ability required for appointment
to high judicial office.” Id. at art. 254.
43 Tomáš Dumbrovský et al., Judicial Appointments: The Article 255 TFEU Advisory Panel and Selection Procedures in the Member States, 51 COMMON MKT. L. REV.
455, 459 (2014).
44 Council Decision 2010/125/EU, Appointing the Members of the Panel
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The assessment criteria of the Committee are more comprehensive
than the standards stipulated in the Treaty. It considers that judges or advocates general from the Court of Justice should possess
more than twenty years of experience with high-level duties and
that judges at the General Court should have more than twelve
years’ experience with similar duties.45 The Committee states that
it assesses the candidates’ grasp of “the main aspects of EU law,”
but it does not “seek to assess the scope and comprehensiveness”
of the candidate’s expertise in EU law.46 The requirement to speak
French remains a soft constraint, and the Committee expects the
candidates to at least acquire proficiency in French “within a reasonable time.”47
To be sure, the Committee constitutes an encouraging first step
in providing some safeguards to the appointment process, and a
few Member States’ governments have recently overhauled their
own selection processes to introduce more transparency and formality.48 However, in a few countries, such as Greece, Italy, and
Spain, appointment remains exclusively controlled by the executives.49 Moreover, the power of the Committee is very limited. It
has no power to nominate or choose between candidates but only
has the power to consider one candidate at a time and to issue a
non-binding opinion.50 The composition of the Committee also
suffers from democratic deficit. The President of the Court nominates six of the seven members, and one is nominated by the Euro-

Provided for in Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 1, 2010 O.J. (L 50) 20, 20 (EU).
45 The Council of the Eur. Union, Activity Report of the Panel Provided for in
Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 6509/2011, at
9–10 (Feb. 17, 2011), http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=
ST%206509%202011%20INIT [https://perma.cc/FM3W-N8PU].
46 The Council of the Eur. Union, Third Activity Report of the Panel provided
for in Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 19, SN
11118/2014 (Dec. 13, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/
application/pdf/2014-02/rapport-c-255-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XHU-T2F9].
47 Id.
48 Dumbrovský, supra note 43.
49 Id. at 467.
50 TFEU, supra note 9, at art. 255. See also Dumbrovský, supra note 43, at 459
(describing the power of the panel to give a favorable or unfavorable opinion but
not including any nomination powers).
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pean Parliament.51
By December 2013, the Committee had examined thirty-two
new candidates and delivered seven unfavorable opinions on candidates from Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Romania, Sweden, Lithuania,
and the Czech Republic.52 These candidates were all running for
positions at the General Court. A few candidates were rejected for
lack of professional experience, on the basis that their “length of
high-level professional experience” was “manifestly too short.”53
Some candidates were rejected for “insufficient familiarity with EU
law.”54
This disturbing fact reflects the severity of the lack of quality
control by some nominating states during the selection process.
Without rigorous procedural safeguards for judicial appointment, the quality of the EU judges appointed to the Court is bound
to vary significantly. Interviewees indicated that the less capable
the EU judge is, the more he or she will need to rely on the référendaires to carry out the judicial functions.55 As a consequence,
the voices of référendaires are amplified, and in some instances
they even effectively become the judges behind the scenes.56
3.2. Compensation
The Court is an attractive workplace for European jurists, not
Id. at 460.
Dumbrovský, supra note 43.
53 The Council of the Eur. Union, supra note 46, at 20.
54 Id.
55 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on
file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, London, Eng. (April 10,
2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, London,
Eng. (April 10, 2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Member of the
Court, in London, Eng. (Mar, 12, 2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with
Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Feb. 19, 2015) (notes on file with Author);
Interview with Member of the Court, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file
with Author); Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014)
(notes on file with Author); Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg
(May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author).
56 See supra note 55 (referring to the same series of interviews).
51
52
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only for its prestige but also its generous compensation package.
Currently the President of the Court of Justice is entitled to a
€306,654 (equivalent to the President of the Commission) annual
salary. The Vice President is entitled to €277,767 (equivalent to the
Vice-President of the Commission), and other judges and advocates general are entitled to €249,989 (equivalent to a Commissioner of the Commission).57 They also enjoy generous entertainment
allowances ranging from €7,292 for ordinary judges to €17,016 annually for the President.58 The Presidents of the chambers are entitled to an additional €9,729.59 In addition, EU judges enjoy generous fringe benefits, including a car and a driver and a residence
allowance equal to 15% of their salary.60 When they leave the
bench, EU judges are also entitled to generous pension benefits61
and transitional allowances.62 The judges from the General Court
similarly enjoy a generous compensation package even though
their salaries are lower. Currently the President of the General
Court is entitled to €249,989 in yearly salary; the Vice President is
entitled to €239,990; and other judges are entitled to €231,101.63
They also receive entertainment allowances ranging from €6,650
for ordinary judges to €7,292 annually for the President.64 The
Presidents of the chambers are entitled to an additional €8,873 each

57 See Council Regulation 422/67/EEC, 5/67/Euratom of the Council of 25
July 1967 Determining the Emoluments of the President and Members of the
Commission, of the President, Judges, Advocates-General and Registrar of the
Court of Justice, of the President, Members and Registrar of the General Court
and of the President, Members and Registrar of the European Union Civil Service
Tribunal, art. 2, 1967 O.J. (L 187) 222, 222 (showing salary and pension information by different criteria such as age, years of service, title, etc.). See also Council Regulation No 31 (EEC), 11 (EAEC), Laying Down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European
Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community [hereinafter
Staff
Regulations],
art.
66,
1962R0031,
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/aboutus/jobs/documents/staff_regulations_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XHV7-UB4F] (laying out the monthly salaries for EU staff
members).
58 Council Regulation 422/67/EEC, supra note 57, at art. 4(3).
59 Id.
60 Id. at art. 4.
61 Id.
62 Id. at art. 7.
63 Id. at art. 21(a)(2).
64 Id. at art. 21(a)(3).
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year.65 Salaries of EU judges are subject to both income tax and a
solidarity levy.66 For instance, the net salary of a judge at the Court
of Justice (with no management role) with no dependent spouse or
children is €203,652.67
As one of the criteria for appointment to the Court of Justice is
that the candidate should possess the qualifications required for
appointments to the national Supreme Court, I use the salary of the
national Supreme Court judges as a crude proxy for the preexisting salary of EU judges. To be sure, some members of the
Court were in private practice immediately before they joined the
Court and they could have enjoyed higher incomes than national
Supreme Court justices. However, such members are only a small
minority. As shown in Appendix I, 74% of the Court members
were civil servants (27%), academics (19%), or national court judges (28%) immediately before joining the Court. Only 7% were engaged in private practice, with most coming from the UK and Ireland.
Table 1 below compares both the gross and net annual salary of
judges from national Supreme Courts and those of an ordinary
judge at the Court of Justice. Table 2 adjusts for the cost of living
and provides the equivalent salary of national Supreme Court
judges if they live in Luxembourg. These two tables show that the
vast majority of EU judges received a significant pay raise, particularly for judges from Eastern European countries. This stands in
sharp contrast to the status of judicial salaries in the United States,
where most judges could earn significantly higher wages when
working for other employers. However, the relatively low US
wages have not prevented the US judiciary from attracting the best
legal minds. Indeed, judicial positions are highly regarded in the
United States and “[come] as a kind of crowning achievement relatively late in life.”68
Id.
E-mail from Press and Information Unit, Court of Justice of the European
Union to Author (July 22, 2015, 06:38 GMT) (on file with Author).
67 Id.
68 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN
65
66
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Table 1: Comparison of Salaries of National Supreme Court
Judges with EU judges69

AMERICA 34 (3d ed. 2007).
69 The salary data of judges at the national Supreme Courts is compiled based
on the 2012 data collected by the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice. Eur. Comm’n for the Efficiency of Justice, European Judicial Systems–Edition
2014 (2012 data): Efficiency and Quality of Justice 309 (2014),
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/2014/Rapport_2014_
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UPY-P5S8].
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* As described above, according to the data provided by the
Court, the current gross annual salary of a judge at the Court of
Justice (with no management role) is €249,989; the net annual salary of such a judge with no dependents (spouse and/or children) is
€203,652.
Table 2: Comparison of Salaries of National Supreme Court
Judges with EU Judges (after adjusting for costs of living)70

EU
Country

Equivalent
Gross Annual
Salary of
National
Supreme
Court Judges
(€)

Bulgaria
Lithuania
Hungary
Latvia
Malta
Romania
Slovakia
Estonia
Czech
Greece
Poland
Croatia
Slovenia

70,048
54,568
74,293
62,693
58,151
93,442
74,637
73,028
101,760
79,547
130,710
113,051
92,044

Equivalent
Net Annual
Salary of
National
Supreme
Court Judges
(€)

63,038
41,471
53,634
42,622
47,594
65,540
N/A
57,606
N/A
65,623
93,096
56,096
49,463

EU Judge
Gross
Annual
Salary* to
National
Supreme
Court Judges

4.1
5.3
3.9
4.6
4.9
3.1
3.9
3.9
2.8
3.6
2.2
2.5
3.1

EU Judge
Net
Annual
Salary* to
National
Supreme
Court
Judges

3.8
5.8
4.5
5.7
5.1
3.7
N/A
4.2
N/A
3.7
2.6
4.3
4.9

70 The salary of national Supreme Court judges is adjusted using the 2014
price level index compiled by Eurostat. The index is available online. Comparative
Price Levels of Consumer Goods and Services, EUROSTAT (last modified June 15, 2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Comparative_price_levels_of_consumer_goods_and_services
#Price_level_indices [https://perma.cc/XG8H-SL3D].
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98,080
90,720
123,189
138,794
122,313
130,616
134,323
125,561
139,351
129,943
179,621
153,712
211,467
195,642
252,006

N/A
N/A
N/A
86,052
104,180
62,241
46,450
76,637
72,432
N/A

N/A
N/A
115,098
N/A
N/A

2.9
3.2
2.3
2.1
2.4
2.2
2.1
2.3
2.1
2.2
1.6
1.9
1.4
1.5
1.1

N/A
N/A
N/A
2.8
2.3
3.9
5.2
3.1
3.3
N/A

N/A
N/A
2.1
N/A
N/A

* As described above, an EU judge receives a residence allowance which equals 15% of the judge’s salary and is not subject to
tax, and thus the gross annual salary of a EU judge at the Court of
Justice with the residence allowance is €287,487, and the net annual
salary is €241,150.
Economists have long argued that when the appointment process is crude, the quality of the judges selected will actually be
higher when judges are willing to accept a pay-cut to join the judiciary.71 This is because unlike private employees, the government
cannot use external monitors to discipline the performance of
71 See Stephen J. Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to Judicial Salary Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 55 (2009) (stating how individuals that
are committed to furthering the public welfare or that are hard workers are more
willing to become judges even with lower salaries); Paul E. Greenberg & James A.
Haley, The Role of Compensation Structure in Enhancing Judicial Quality, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 417, 418 (1986) (explaining that those willing to accept a reduction in compensation in exchange for positions as judges seek non-pecuniary benefits of holding such a position and are therefore more likely to be better judges because nonpecuniary driven individuals are more likely to show self-restraint).
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judges. Instead, the government relies primarily on judges’ own
self-restraint to promote excellence. For those who are willing to
accept a lower salary, they are signaling that they view the nonpecuniary benefits of being a judge as outweighing the pecuniary
loss they suffer.72 These individuals are more likely to exhibit selfrestraint, a desirable quality for good judges.73
To be sure, if a salary is set too low, the attractiveness of the judicial positions will be eroded, and the quality and independence
of the judiciary will be threatened.74 However, EU judges’ salary is
currently set at a level that far exceeds the pre-existing salary for
the vast majority of national Supreme Court judges. It is therefore
very likely that most judges received a significant pay raise for being appointed to the Court. Such a salary structure is not only going to attract more qualified candidates but also those less genuinely interested in judging than in the perks and benefits the job
brings. As the EU judicial appointment process is often opaque
and political, a higher salary could attract those primarily seeking a
leisurely life in Luxembourg or those yearning for power and influence. As Choi and his co-authors argue, leisure seekers would
need a higher salary to support their leisurely activities (e.g., expensive vacations), and power seekers would find it more satisfying to work for a high-paying job, as higher salary entails higher
social status.75 Therefore, when the appointment is not strictly
made on the merits, a high salary increases the chance that appointments are used as political patronage to reward loyal functionaries or political allies. Interviewees observed that some judges who received significant pay increases are indeed political
appointees who are not competent to perform their duties and are
dominated by their référendaires.76
Greenberg, supra note 71, at 418.
Id.
74 Id. at 421.
75 Choi, supra note 71, at 55.
76 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on
file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Apr. 10,
2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, in London,
Eng. (Feb. 19, 2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Member of the
Court, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author); Interview with
Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author);
72
73
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3.3. Tenure
EU judges serve renewable six-year terms. On average, judges
at the General Court served eight years, judges at the Court of Justice served nine years, and advocates general served seven years,
as indicated in Appendix II. But the variability is quite high. The
longest a judge has served at the Court is twenty-one years, and
the shortest stay is less than a year. Furthermore, over 42% of the
EU judges served no more than six years. In particular, 41% of
judges appointed to the Court of Justice and 52% of judges appointed to the General Court were not renewed after serving one
term.
This short tenure hampers the productivity of judges. Judges
require a year or two to familiarize themselves with the court’s
procedures and style.77 As shown in Appendix I, only 18% and 5%
of the judges at the General Court and the Court of Justice have
clerked at the Court before. Some judges who are not familiar with
the Court’s procedures and formality complained that they did not
get sufficient support when they first started their jobs.78 Every
three years, half of the judges at the Court are subject to renewal.
These judges cannot take on much responsibility for about six
months before their departure, which causes great instability in the
formation of the chambers of judges and their work.79 Thus, if a
judge stays at the Court for only one term, his productive time
spent on the Court is likely to be only three to four years. Worse
yet, Judge Franklin Dehousse from the General Court observed
Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file
with Author).
77 See Marc van der Woude, Judge, Eur. Union Gen. Court, Presentation at
King’s College London: The General Court: The Need and Opportunity for Reform (Mar. 8, 2013) (presenting the slides available at https://
www.kcl.ac.uk/law/research/centres/european/KCL-Marc-van-der-WoudeGC-Reform-08-03-13.pdf).
78 Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Apr. 10, 2015) (notes
on file with Author).
79 House of Lords, Eur. Union Comm., Report of Session 2006-2007, An EU
Competition Court 96 (2007) (testimony from John Cooke, a former Irish judge at
the General Court).
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that in 2011 50% of judges at his Court were appointed outside the
normal triennial renewal procedure.80 As he noted: “The General
Court is thus in permanent reorganization, and regularly looks like
the waiting room of an airport, with permanent new arrivals, departures, announcements . . . and delays.”81
Moreover, the requirement of French on the job further hampers judicial performance. Since the expansion of the EU in 2004, a
growing number of judges, especially those from Eastern European
states, have found it difficult to deliberate in French.82 This is because French is not a widely spoken language in Eastern European
and Nordic countries,83 and it has been difficult for these countries
to identify competent candidates that are suitable for the position.84
Thus, if a judge expects that he will only be on the job for a short
period of time, he will be less likely to invest time to improve his
French or learn EU law.
This uncertainty in judicial reappointment and the high turnover of EU judges means that judges must rely more heavily on their référendaires to do the work for
them.85
80 FRANKLIN DEHOUSSE, EGMONT PAPER NO. 53, THE REFORM OF THE EU COURTS
THE
NEED
OF
A
MANAGEMENT
APPROACH
14
(2011),
http://
www.egmontinstitute.be/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ep53.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/2V4U-9NBH].
81 Id.
82 Editorial Comments, The Court of Justice in Limelight Again, 45 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 1571, 1577 (2008).
83 See Eur. Comm’n, Europeans and Their Languages Report, 31, Special Eurobarometer no. 386, (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/
ebs/ebs_386_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FNY-Y5F8] (showing that only 1% of the
population in many eastern European countries and less than 5% of the population in Nordic countries were able to speak French well enough to have a conversation).
84 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on
file with Author); Interview with Former Member of the Court, in London, Eng.
(Feb. 10, 2015) (notes on file with Author). See also Konrad Schiemann, The Functioning of the Court of Justice in An Enlarged Union and the Future of the Court, in
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN EU LAW: ARTICLES IN HONOR OF SIR FRANCIS JACOB 3, 10
(Anthony Arnull et al. eds., 2008) (explaining how it is very difficult to find judges
that have the necessary French language skills to provide meaningful input in
complex cases).
85 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (Apr. 29, 2015) (notes on
file with Author); Interview with Former Member of the Court, in London, Eng.
(Feb. 10, 2015) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Member of the Court, in
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4. RÉFÉRENDAIRES
Référendaires are a hidden workforce within the Court. Some
call them the Court’s “ghost writers.”86 Their names are never
mentioned in any judgments nor does the Court publicize their
profiles. Nonetheless, they play an indispensable role during the
Court’s decision-making process. While the working style of each
judge is different and the involvement of référendaires varies, they
generally assume the responsibility of digesting the written submissions and ploughing through various annexes to understand
the facts and reasoning of each case.87 They also shoulder much of
the responsibility for drafting the various reports and providing
comments.88
In February 2015, I used LinkedIn89 to hand-collect the background data for seventy-four current référendaires, of whom thirty-one work for the Court of Justice and forty-three for the General
Court. This represents 25% of current référendaires at the Court of
Justice and 46% of those at the General Court.90 In March 2015, I
hand-collected the background data of 103 former référendaires
Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author); Interview with Current
Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author); Interview
with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author).
86 Michal Bobek, The Court of Justice of the European Union, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF EU LAW 153, 169 (Anthony Arnull & Damian Chalmers eds., 2015).
87 See Sally J. Kenney, Beyond Principals and Agents: Seeing Courts as Organizations by Comparing Référendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the
U.S. Supreme Court, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 593, 611 (2000) (showing how référendaires take on great responsibility for examining the submissions filed at the
Court, preparing the reports for hearings, assisting with the drafting of opinions,
and how these tasks vary according to the role of the judge they work for).
88 Id. See also DIANE HANSEN-INGRAM, Tales from the Tartan Chambers, in A
TRUE EUROPEAN: ARTICLES FOR JUDGE DAVID EDWARD 1, 3 (Mark Hoskins & William
Robinson eds., 2004) (observing how Judge David Edward delegated work to his
référendaires).
89 LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/ [https://perma.cc/CNS5-8MLJ]
(last visited Oct. 8, 2016).
90 The LinkedIn data has been cross-referenced with EU’s official directory
“Whoiswho,” which discloses the names of the current référendaires. EU
Whoiswho, supra note 15.
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from LinkedIn. The summary statistics of the education and professional experience of these référendaires are presented in Appendix III. Their years of prior work experience and tenure at the
Court are presented in Appendix IV.
Admittedly, since the data is collected from LinkedIn, it is likely that some groups are underrepresented in the samples. Law
firms and other private businesses tend to rely more on
headhunters who use LinkedIn to tap talents than public institutions, which normally have formal channels for recruitment.
Therefore, former référendaires who are currently working for
public institutions such as national governments, national judiciaries, and EU institutions are less incentivized to use LinkedIn than
those who are in private practice. Similarly, current référendaires
who plan to work for public institutions upon departing the Court
are less incentivized to use LinkedIn than those who wish to go into private practice. This is especially true for référendaires who
were seconded from public institutions. For instance, interviewees
indicate that a sizeable portion of référendaires are administrative
judges from France but none of them appear in the samples.91 Notably, the bias is probably more pronounced for former référendaires as current référendaires have a number of exit options available to them.
4.1. The Labor Market
Like law clerks in the United States, référendaires are chosen
by the individual judges who can also fire them at will. However,
unlike the United States, where federal law clerks are recruited
through an open online system,92 the Court lacks an official re91 Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes
in file with Author); Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5,
2014) (notes in file with Author)
92 See
OSCAR,
U.S.
COURTS,
https://oscar.uscourts.gov/home
[https://perma.cc/9NKR-GKUG] (allowing US federal judges to post law clerk
positions and law students to use the same platform to apply for clerkship). Note,
however, that the recruitment process of US federal judicial law clerks also faces a
whole host of problems. See e.g., Christopher Avery et al., The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 447, 476–83 (2007) (highlighting explod-
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cruitment program. Thus judges rely exclusively on informal
channels to recruit référendaires, such as from among their former
employees, subordinates, students, or those recommended by their
personal friends or former colleagues. Job seekers also lack information regarding vacancies at the Court and the particular requirements of judges. Thus the labor market for référendaires is
very inefficient for both buyers (the judges) and sellers (the référendaires). A référendaire who was interviewed noted that candidates generally know someone already working there in order to
get hired.93
Meanwhile, the requirement of French as a working language
significantly limits the pool of eligible candidates for référendaires.
Compared with the diverse nationalities of EU judges, the background of référendaires is relatively homogeneous. The requirement of French as a working language significantly limits the pool
of eligible candidates for référendaires. Therefore, native French
speakers enjoy an inherent advantage.
As a consequence, the network of référendaires becomes relatively impermeable to outsiders. The sample of seventy-four current and 103 former référendaires I collected from LinkedIn provides strong support for this observation. As shown in Table 3
below, the three schools most attended by these référendaires are
all located in French-speaking countries: College of Europe
(23.6%), Université Panthéon-Assas (10.3%), and Université
Panthéon-Sorbonne (9.7%). It should be noted, however, that College of Europe also offers a significant portion of its classes in English. The leading former employer is the Court itself (16.9%), as
many référendaires used to work as linguists or researchers in the
Court, followed by the Commission (13.6%); these two bodies far
exceed the third most common former employers Van Bael & Bellis
(4%) and Linklaters (4%). Indeed, the employment of internal administrative staff to fill in the référendaire positions shows the importance that judges place on understanding the institutional
workings of the Court. It also reveals the closed nature of the neting offers, high market compression, and moral dilemmas as some of the issues of
the US federal judicial recruitment system).
93 Telephone interview with Current Référendaire (Feb. 12, 2015) (notes on
file with Author).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/2

2016]

97

THE FACELESS COURT

work inside the Court.
Table 3: Most Common Law Schools and Former Employers
Among a Sample of 177 Référendaires
Most Common
Law Schools94
1. College of Europe
2. Université
Panthéon-Assas
(Paris II)
3. Université
PanthéonSorbonne (Paris I)
4. Harvard University
5. King's College
London
6. Université Libre
de Bruxelles
7. Oxford University
8. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
9. Cambridge University
10. Université
Catholique de
Louvain
10. Institut
d'études politiques

%

23.6
10.3
9.7
9.1
7.9
7.3
6.7
6.1
5.5
4.8

Most Common Former
Employers95
1. Court of Justice of the
European Union
2. European Commission
3. Van Bael & Bellis
3. Linklaters LLP
5. Cleary Gottlieb Steen
& Hamilton LLP
6. European Parliament
7. European Free Trade
Association
8. College of Europe
8. Allen & Overy LLP
8. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP

%

16.9
13.6
4.0
4.0
3.4
2.8
2.3
2.3
2.3
2.3

4.8

94 Twelve of the 177 référendaires’ LinkedIn profiles contain no education
background. The data here therefore only presents the education information of
165 référendaires.
95 Thirteen of the 177 référendaires’ LinkedIn profiles contain missing information about their work experience so it is possible that the actual shares of these
former employers are higher than what is presented here.
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4.8

Figure 1 is a sociogram of the network data of these référendaires.96 Each node represents one of the 177 référendaires. Two
types of network connections are presented here: a green line between nodes indicates that the two référendaires were classmates
at law school, while an orange line indicates that they overlapped
with one another at a previous workplace. The defining feature of
this sociogram is a large cluster of dense connection among 117 référendaires (66%), with three small clusters of référendaires belonging to smaller social network groups. Only 46 nodes (26%) are
isolated, indicating that the vast majority of référendaires have
strong in-group ties and most likely had connections with the
Court prior to joining. Figure 1 also reveals that those référendaires who received legal education in French-speaking countries
and who were formerly employed by either the Court or the
Commission are tightly interconnected at the center of the sociogram. These référendaires possess valuable social capital as their
positions and connections become “[assets] in [their] own rights.”97

The network data only shows the connection among the 177 référendaires
based on their LinkedIn profiles. As the profiles of some référendaires are incomplete (as discussed in supra notes 94 and 95 and the accompanying text), it is possible that there are more connections among these référendaires than what is presented in Figure 1 here.
97 RONALD S. BURT, BROKERAGE & CLOSURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
CAPITAL 4 (2005).
96
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Figure 1: The Social Network of a Sample of 177 Référendaires98
(Notes: The color of the nodes represents the educational
background of référendaires. Blue (white) nodes represent those
référendaires who received (did not receive) their legal education
in France, Belgium, or Luxembourg. The shape of the nodes represents the previous work experience of référendaires. Triangles
represent the référendaires formerly employed at the Commission.
Upside-down triangles represent the référendaires who used to
work in other positions at the Court. Double-triangles represent
former employment at both bodies. Circles represent référendaires
who had never worked at either the Court or the Commission. The
lines represent the ties between référendaires. Orange lines indicate that the référendaires were former colleagues. Green lines indicate that the référendaires were classmates at law school. Black
lines indicate both.)
Because of this relatively closed network, current référendaires
become attractive candidates for new judges. Normally, a référendaire only serves one judge at a time and will not switch to another
judge during the former's tenure. Référendaires can, however, be
“inherited” by other judges upon the departure of the original
judge. Thus an internal labor market of référendaires exists within
98 Figure 1 can be viewed in color at: http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/
jil/vol38/iss1.
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the Court. As shown in Appendix III, within the sample of seventy-four current référendaires, 37% from the General Court and 30%
from the Court of Justice have served at the Court longer than their
judges, indicating that they must have worked for more than one
judge.
Appendix III reveals another important feature of référendaires—the vast majority of them are experienced lawyers prior to
the joining the Court and many have varied experiences. In particular, 20% of current référendaires worked in other positions in
the Court (such as linguists and researchers); 12% served in their
respective national governments, 20% worked at the Commission;
24% held academic positions; and 37% were in private practice.
For former référendaires, 7% held other positions in the Court; 8%
worked in the national courts; 18% were government officials; 7%
worked for the Commission; 27% held academic positions; and
56% were in private practice. Notably, a significantly higher percentage of former référendaires were engaged in private practice
than that of current référendaires. This is probably due to the fact
that the sample of the former référendaires is more biased towards
over-representing private attorneys and under-representing lawyers at public institutions.
As shown in Appendix IV, the average prior working experience of current and former référendaires is six years and four
years, respectively. These figures contrast with those for law clerks
from the United States, the vast majority of whom are fresh graduates rather than experienced lawyers. This seems to suggest that
EU judges rely more heavily on their clerks to do the work for
them than US judges do.
4.2. Career Structure and Conservatism
Référendaires are well paid. Like employees at other EU institutions, the salary of référendaires is mainly tied to age and seniority at the Court. For instance, a référendaire who was hired at the
age of thirty-five before 2004 would be awarded a grade of A11
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(step 1) and is entitled to a basic salary of approximately €110,374.99
After he works for the Court for ten years, he will be graded A14
(Step 1) and be entitled to approximately €159,866.100 Therefore,
the older and more experienced the référendaire, the more expensive he or she becomes. Judges, however, do not bear the cost of
hiring référendaires. While there is a quota on how many référendaires a judge can have, there is no limit on the cost of référendaires. Judges may therefore have a preference for référendaires
with more seniority and experience, even though they are costlier.101
Unlike employees at other EU institutions, référendaires are
not eligible for promotion. Some however are elected to become
judges later in their careers. As shown in Appendix I, 18% of judges from the General Court, and 5% of judges and 11% of advocates
general from the Court of Justice had experience working as référendaires before joining the Court. Few however are elected to become judges directly.102 But this lack of career advancement has
not discouraged référendaires from pursuing long-term careers at
the Court. Financial benefit is an important consideration. Référendaires enjoy compensation packages similar to officials at other
EU institutions. After ten years of service, référendaires are eligible for generous pensions as civil servants when they reach the age
99 Staff Regulations, supra note 57, at art. 66. Similar to judges, référendaires’
income is also subject to a community tax and a solidarity tax. See Permanent Officials, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/job/official/index_
en.htm#4 [https://perma.cc/VK3Z-Q36U] (showing the taxes European servants
are subject to); E-mail from Press and Information Unit, supra note 41 (nothing the
taxes these salaries are subject to).
100 Staff Regulations, supra note 57, at art. 66.
101 For instance, Judge Dehousse suggested that the General Court could consider creating a limited number of senior référendaire positions with six-year, renewable terms contractually linked to the General Court but not to a particular
judge. Dehousse, supra note 80, at 15.
102 Based on the data disclosed by the Court, Mark Jaeger from Luxembourg,
Maria Eugenia Martins de Nazare Ribeiro from Portugal, and Hubert Legal from
France are examples of judges who worked as référendaires immediately before
they
joined
the
Court.
InfoCuria,
General
Court,
CURIA,
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_217427/en/
[https://perma.cc/X8ASVD5S] (last visited Oct. 8, 2016); InfoCuria, Presentation des Membres, CURIA,
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7035/fr/ [https://perma.cc/6LG5-927M]
(last visited Oct. 8, 2016).
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of sixty-six.103 A 1994 study found that the Court had fifty-six référendaires at that time, among which the most tenured had served
thirteen years; two référendaires had worked for twelve years, and
one had worked for eleven years; with the average amount of work
experience being five years.104 Based on the sample of seventy-four
current référendaires, as seen in Appendix IV, on average référendaires have served more than seven years at the Court. But the
variability is once again quite high. In fact, twenty-three (more
than 31%) have served more than a decade. One référendaire from
the Court of Justice has served for more than twenty-two years,
and one from the General Court has served for more than twentysix years, longer than the longest-serving judge in the Court’s history.105
Despite the financial benefits, référendaires are temporary
workers and do not have the same job security as officials in other
EU institutions. They can be fired by the judges at will and may
not be able to find another job at the Court when their judges leave
the bench.106 This job insecurity has a pronounced impact on how
référendaires behave, especially for those who want to pursue a
long-term career inside the Court. Of course, the evaluation of référendaires solely depends on their performance to the satisfaction
of their judges, but given the nature of the work delegated to référendaires, judges are unlikely to encourage their référendaires to
take a bold, intellectually challenging approach to law.107 This is
especially true for career référendaires.108
At the same time, the longevity of career référendaires also
See Staff Regulation, supra note 57, at art. 77.
Kenney, supra note 87, at 605–06.
105 Kenney notes that in the first two decades of the Court, each member of
the Court had one référendaire who was a permanent employee, and each new
member would inherit his or her successor’s référendaire. Id. at 605. But référendaires became temporary posts in the 1970s. Id.
106 For this reason, some référendaires took the requisite exams for EU civil
servants and became functionaries, which then qualified them to work for other
EU institutions. Telephone Interview with Current Référendaire (Feb. 26, 2015)
(notes on file with Author).
107 Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Feb. 19, 2015)
(notes on file with Author); Interview with Member of the Court, in Luxembourg
(May 5, 2014) (notes on file with Author).
108 Id.
103
104
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gives them tremendous power. Many EU judges serve relatively
short tenures at the Court (almost 42% of them stay no more than
six years). Some judges lack a background in EU law or struggle
with the French language (or both). When judges first start at the
Court, they lack adequate support and training to operate efficiently and also need time to familiarize themselves with the Court’s
working procedure and drafting styles. In contrast, career référendaires are fluent in French, highly skilled in the Court’s drafting
style, well-versed in EU law and precedents, and familiar with the
institutional workings of the Court. Therefore, less able judges rely
heavily on these career référendaires. Interviewees noted that because these référendaires have the tendency to strictly adhere to
the Court’s precedents, formality, and style, they represent a force
of conservatism and formalism at the Court.109
The Court’s formalism can find its origin in the French legal
tradition. When the Court was first established it was modeled after the prototype of the Conseil d’Etat— the highest administrative
court in France.110 The French influence on the Court is profound
and many of its rules and procedures are obvious derivatives of
French administrative law.111 Compared with the common law
tradition, the French legal tradition emphasized a high degree of
procedural formalism to minimize the discretion of judges.112 As
Judge Posner once described it: “This is the idea that the judge has
no will, makes no value choices, but is just a calculating machine.”113 Inevitably and invariably, the formalistic interpretation
of law requires the Court to discount or even disregard economic
109 Id. See also Karen McAuliffe, Precedent in the Court of Justice of the European
Union: The Linguistic Aspect, 15 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 483, 488–91 (2013) (observing how the Court’s formalistic style of drafting imposes a serious constraint on
the work of the référendaires, causing them to tend to strictly adhere to the language of precedents).
110 Edward, supra note 18, at 539.
111 See Giuseppe Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Language, Culture and
Politics in the Life of the European Court of Justice, 1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 397, 399 (1994)
(observing that France’s political and legal thinking hegemony framed the foundational treaties of the European Union).
112 Thorsten Beck & Ross Levine, Legal Institutions and Financial Development,
in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 251, 255 (Claude Menard & Mary
M. Shirley eds., 2005).
113 Richard A. Posner, Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L. J. 1, 3 (1983).
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realities.114 As observed by Marc van der Woude, a judge at the
General Court, when asked what he likes the least about his job:
“I have difficulties in finding negative aspects of my current
job. However, there may be two things, which I sometimes find irritating and inefficient: formalism and conservatism. Like many
other lawyers, judges tend to have a disproportionate interest in
form. Obviously, form is important, but the attention to form and
detail should never distract from the substance of a case. Also,
lawyers tend to be conservative and feel comforted by the existence of precedents. I am regularly confronted with arguments that
do not have any other merit than referring to past practices or customs. This backward-looking mentality is not very helpful, if one
wants to increase the Court’s productivity and the quality of its
judgments.”115
4.3. Revolving Door
Due to the relatively close social network and the difficulty of
finding French-speaking candidates who are well-versed in EU
law, Commission officials become an important source of talent.
Based on the sample in Appendix III, 30% of current référendaires
from the General Court used to work for the Commission—in particular 13% worked for the Legal Service, and 8% served at the Directorate-General for Competition. The percentage at the Court of
Justice is lower; 7% of current référendaires used to work for the
Commission. Indeed, Commission officials have the opportunity
to seek secondment at the Court, while keeping their ranking within the Commission. For instance, the Legal Service, which is the inhouse department within the Commission and regularly represents
the Commission in front of the Court, started to send secondees to
the Court in the 1980s.116 Based on one study in 1994, among the
114 Barak Orbach, The Durability of Antitrust Formalism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2197,
2199 (2015).
115 Nicolas Petit, Marc Van Der Woude, THE FRIDAY SLOT (Nov. 16, 2012),
http://chillingcompetition.com/2012/11/16/the-friday-slot-13-marc-van-derwoude/ [https://perma.cc/M52U-RK6J]. It should be noted that while Judge Van
Der Woude’s statements seem to only mention judges, they should be interpreted
to also include référendaires as they are often the judges behind the scenes.
116 Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (October 7, 2015)
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fifty-six référendaires working at the Court at that time, six were
seconded from the Commission.117
Among the sample of former référendaires, 7% worked at the
Commission prior to joining the Court. Upon their departure, 16%
joined the Commission (9% for the Legal Service), representing a
9% increase. This suggests that the experience of working as a référendaire is very valuable for the Commission, especially for the
Legal Service. As the skillsets at the Legal Service and the Court
are highly transferable, even when a Commission employee does
not join the Court on a secondment scheme, “the Commission is
glad to take him or her back at the end of the period of being a référendaire,” as one former senior Commission official puts it.118
Appendix V further examines thirty-five former and current référendaires who have had experience working at both the Commission and the Court. Among them, twelve served at the Commission immediately before they joined the Court, twenty joined
the Commission immediately after they left the Court (eleven
joined the Legal Service), and five served both before and after. On
average they have eight years of experience at the Commission and
four years of experience working at the Court, though the variance
is very high. This shows that a veritable revolving door exists between the Commission and the Court.
Abundant literature in law, economics, and political science has
voiced concern that revolving doors can lead to regulatory capture.119 As the EU’s main executive arm, the Commission is the
most frequent party appearing in front of the Court.120 This raises
(notes on file with Author).
117 Kenney, supra note 87, at 607.
118 E-mail from Former Official, European Comm’n to Author (Feb. 12, 2015)
(on file with Author).
119 For a comprehensive survey of literature on the revolving door, see generally Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265 (2015)
(explaining the need to recognize the “incentive for regulators to expand the market demand for services they would be providing when they exit the government”).
120 Since the Court’s establishment, the Commission has served as a party in
over 52% of the cases. I hand-collected this data using the Court’s database. In-
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the immediate question of whether adequate procedural safeguards exist to address the potential conflicts of interest between
the Court and the Commission. To be sure, a revolving door between business and government is not uncommon in Europe. EU
Staff Regulations have put in place specific measures that address
this concern. Before recruitment as an EU official, the candidate is
required to inform the appointing authority of any actual or potential conflict of interest.121 Within two years after leaving the post,
the official has the mandatory obligation to notify his institution of
his occupational activity.122 If the activity is related to the work
carried out by the official during the last three years of service and
could lead to a conflict with the interests of the EU institution, the
appointing authority may either forbid him from undertaking it or
impose certain restrictions.123 In addition, senior EU officials are
subject to a one-year “cooling off” period, which bans them from
lobbying their former institutions “for their business, clients or
employers on matters for which they were responsible during the
last three years in service.”124
It appears, however, that the EU Staff Regulations have never
been applied to manage the potential conflicts of interest for officials moving between different EU institutions. Based on the
Court’s disclosure, référendaires have the obligation of declaring
any actual or potential conflict of interest situation at the time of
his or her employment.125 Yet according to the Rules for Good
Conduct for référendaires adopted by the Court in 2009, référendaires only have the obligation to inform their judges or advocates
general if they worked on the same case in their former workplaces. 126 It is then left up to their judges or advocates general to de-

foCuria, supra note 31.
121 Staff Regulations, supra note 57, at art. 11.
122 Id. at art. 16.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 E-mail from Access to Documents Unit, Court of Justice of the European
Union to Author (Oct. 7, 2015) (on file with Author).
126 La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes, Decision du 17 Fevrier 2009, Portant Adoption De Regles de Bonne Conduite des Referendaires, art.
2(2) (Feb. 17, 2009). The original version of the Code of Good Conduct is in
French and was requested from the Court.
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cide whether they can continue working on the same matter.127
Even if they are prohibited from doing so, Commission secondees
are free to work on any other cases as long as they were not personally involved in the matter. Since the Commission is an important player in most EU cases, in reality Commission secondees
cannot possibly be excluded from all cases in which the Commission appears.
Another consequence of the revolving door is that it allows the
Commission to conduct intelligence surveillance on the Court. As
Court membership is fluid and the preferences of individual judges vary, the revolving door makes it possible for the Commission
to keep pace with its changing landscape. Commission secondees
can sharpen their litigation tactics, for instance, by learning how to
present arguments that can best persuade particular judges and référendaires at the Court.128 On the other hand, the private bar is at
a comparative disadvantage. Although the private bar can also attract référendaires from the Court, they lack the economy of scale
of the Commission. The Legal Service of the Commission, which
employs more than 200 lawyers,129 is a powerhouse that specializes
in litigation before the Court. Even though private law firms are
also equipped with superb practitioners with in-depth knowledge
of EU law, they lack a sufficient caseload to match the experience
of the Legal Service. Nor are private firms able to run a secondment program as the Commission does to closely monitor the
Court. While private firms could also engage experienced référendaires, the intelligence gathered by those hired tends to become
stale within a few years.

Id.
Telephone Interview with Current Référendaire (Mar. 12, 2015) (notes on
file with Author); Telephone Interview with Current Référendaire (Feb. 19, 2015)
(notes on file with Author).
129 This is based on the Author’s search of the legal service department within the European Commission on the official directory of the European Union. EU
Whoiswho, supra note 15.
127
128
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4.4. The French Dominance
Compared with the diverse nationalities of EU judges, the
background of référendaires is relatively homogeneous. The requirement of French as a working language significantly limits the
pool of eligible candidates for référendaires. Therefore, native
French speakers enjoy an inherent advantage. As Judge Mancini
once remarked:
“Yet the fact of having to speak French, which has been the
Court’s working language since 1952, in the deliberation room and
having to draft judgments in French, puts the non-francophones at
a definite disadvantage vis-à-vis their brethren from France, Belgium and Luxembourg. Being of course accomplished gentlemen,
they would never consciously take advantage of their colleagues’
handicap; but the full mastery of a language—is an irresistible
weapon; and the owner of that weapon will not be likely to refrain
from using it.”130
According to data provided by the Court and provided in Table 4,131 over 42% of référendaires at the Court of Justice are citizens from Belgium, France, and Luxembourg. At the level of the
General Court the percentage is higher, at 49%. The population of
référendaires is concentrated among a few countries, especially
those with the French legal origin and in Germany. On the other
hand, référendaires from the Nordic, common law, and ex-socialist
countries are underrepresented. Indeed, at the General Court there
is only one référendaire from Nordic countries and two from
common law countries.
Using the country of origin as a crude proxy of the legal tradition132 in which a référendaire is bred, Table 4 also shows the
strong influence of the French legal tradition on référendaires.
This is consistent with the data provided in Appendix III, which
indicates 79% of référendaires at the Court of Justice and 83% at
Mancini, supra note 111, at 398.
E-mail from Access to Documents Unit, supra note 16.
132 For the legal origin of each EU member state, see generally T HOMAS H.
REYNOLDS & ARTURO A. FLORES, FOREIGN LAW: CURRENT SOURCES OF CODES AND
BASIC LEGISLATION IN JURISDICTIONS OF THE WORLD (1989).
130
131
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the General Court were educated in law schools located in France,
Belgium, or Luxembourg. Few référendaires come from common
law countries, indicating that the common law tradition probably
has a relatively weak influence on référendaires working in the
Court.
While some référendaires with French legal educations also receive common law training, they are probably a minority. For instance, based on the education background of référendaires in the
sample presented in Appendix III, 38% of current référendaires received law degrees in common law countries. But this figure is
likely to overestimate the common law influence as the samples in
Appendix III over-represent those référendaires with private practice backgrounds and under-represent those with public institution
backgrounds. This is because the private bar (particularly UK and
US law firms) have a stronger preference for common law legal
education than institutional employers. Accordingly, it is likely
that the actual percentage of current référendaires who received
common law training is lower than 38%.
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Table 4: Référendaires based on Country of Origin and Legal
Origin

* Note that a number of référendaires have dual nationalities.
** Switzerland is not a member of the Court, but there are two
référendaires who hold dual citizenship with an EU member state
and with Switzerland.
5. THE CONSEQUENCE OF BANNING DISSENTS
Since its establishment, the Court has adopted a secretive deliberation process, with judges prohibited from revealing how the
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Court reached its decision in a particular case.133 Over the years
the Court has been subject to numerous criticisms for its practice of
issuing a single judgment without dissents.134 While the practice of
issuing a single judgment is common in civil law countries, the
Court now finds itself alone among supranational and international courts (and the majority of national supreme courts and constitutional courts in Europe) in prohibiting the publication of separate
opinions.135 Nevertheless, the practice has persisted.
One major reason for upholding this practice is to preserve the
independence of judges, out of a fear that disclosure of votes will
subject judges to political scrutiny in times of reappointment.136
Another often-cited reason for banning dissents is to preserve the
authority and legitimacy of the Court.137 Proponents of this line of
reasoning argue that the “collegial” decision-making process
means that the Court “holds together throughout the process of
judgment,” and the minority is not excluded from the deliberations
of the majority.138 Moreover, a single judgment enhances the
Court's legitimacy as it fosters the public’s perception of the law as
dependably stable and secure.139 While this was deemed especially
valuable and crucial in the formative years of the Court, the argument is much less convincing today as the Court’s authority has
been well established, and there are few incidents of noncompliance.
133 See Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, supra note 5, at
art. 2 (establishing the duty of judges to perform their duties impartially and in a
confidential manner).
134 E.g., HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 736 (6th ed. 2001) (showing the different arguments utilized
to support the use of dissenting and concurring opinions).
135 Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J.
INT’L L. 307, 309 (2009). See also Director General for Internal Policy, Eur. Comm’n,
Dissenting Opinion in the Supreme Court of the Member States 7 (2012),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/
cont/201304/20130423ATT64963/20130423ATT64963EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/56BU-USQB] (noting that only seven EU Member States never
allow their Supreme Court judges to publish individual opinions).
136 SCHERMERS, supra note 134.
137 Id.
138 Edward, supra note 18, at 556.
139 Id.
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At the same time, even proponents of the single judgment
acknowledge its shortcomings. A single judgment that takes into
account different opinions inevitably tends to blur distinctions and
resorts to qualifications, reducing the clarity of the judgment.
Sometimes ambiguity and unequivocal language are used to cloak
disagreement, leading to criticisms that some of the judgments are
“simply oracular and almost apocryphal.”140 As Judge Edward
maintains: “A camel is said to be a horse designed by a committee,
and some judgments of the Court of Justice are camels.”141
Another risk with single judgments is that they make it more
difficult to assess judicial performance and monitor judicial behavior. In the common law system, the reputation of a judge largely
rests on his or her opinions. This nourishes a judge’s ego by enabling him to cultivate an admiring audience among his peers, practitioners, law professors and the public at large. However, EU
judges cannot establish their individual reputation through judgments. The most they could claim is that they sat on the panel of a
certain case, but the secrecy rule prevents them from making clear
their personal contribution. The unobservability of their inputs
could therefore encourage free riding and judicial shirking.
To be sure, judges face peer pressure when working at the
Court and, thus, would also strive to win the respect of fellow justices and référendaires. This is especially true at the Court of Justice, where the President has exercised discretion in assigning cases
according to the competence and expertise of the judges.142 This
works as both a carrot and a stick. It incentivizes the judges to perform, because otherwise they risk being marginalized—assigned to
small and unimportant cases and excluded from the grand chamber.143 However, at the General Court cases are allocated on a basis
of rotation, and the President at the General Court generally does
140 L. NEVILLE BROWN AND FRANCIS G. JACOB, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 55 (1977).
141 Edward, supra note 18, at 556–57.
142 Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May 5, 2014) (notes
on file with Author); Interview with Current Référendaire, in Luxembourg (May
5, 2014) (notes on file with Author).
143 Id.
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not interfere with case allocation.144 As a consequence, judges at
the General Court face fewer constraints than those at the higher
court. Moreover, given the short tenure of judges and the uncertainty in judicial re-appointment, judges who know they are not
renewed are less incentivized to put in effort. As Rasmussen, one
of the most vocal critics of the Court, once wrote:
“[T]he ban on dissents has served to shield the identity of the
judges making up the majority behind the Court’s decisions, thus
shielding them from accountability. When the names of the judges
forming a fragile majority are made known, such a majority will
certainly invest all their intellectual capacity into delivering wellfounded legal reasoning for their judgments; not the poor type of
reasoning we have seen in the past ten or fifteen years.”145
Such consequences have been observed elsewhere. In the United States, where courts nowadays dispose of a significant percentage of cases by unpublished judgments, judges are seen as less
likely to devote as much effort to unpublished opinions as they do
to signed ones.146 Judges have observed that unpublished cases are
prepared less carefully and are often delegated to staff attorneys or
law clerks.147 As a commentator observed: “When anonymity of
144 See Court of Justice of the Eur. Union, Criteria for Assigning Cases to
Chambers, 2011 O.J. (C 232) 2, 2–3 (noting that the President of the General Court
will not interfere with rotations unless cases are related or derogation is needed to
ensure an even case workload). See also Marc Barennes & Pascale Hecker, Strategic
and Efficient Brief Writing Before the General Court of the European Union: Practical
Suggestions Regarding the Application and the Reply in Competition Law Cases, 4
CONCURRENCE 1, 7 (2012) (noting similarly that the President allocates cases on a
rotation and, thus, no one chamber has exclusive access to competition cases).
145
Hjalte Rasmussen & Louise Nan Rasmussen, Comment on Katalin Kelemen—Activist EU Court “Feeds” on the Existing Ban on Dissenting Opinions: Lifting
the Ban is Likely to Improve the Quality of EU Judgments, 14 GERMAN L. J. 1373, 1385
(2013).
146 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133,
139 (1990). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND
REFORM 165 (2d prtg. 1999) (explaining that without the threat of the opinion being precedential, judges can use unpublished opinions to avoid professional criticism or to “shove difficult issues under the rug in cases where a one-liner would
be too blatant an evasion of judicial duty”).
147 See Ginsburg, supra note 146 (explaining that “unsigned work products,
more often than signed opinions, are fully composed by hands other than a
judge’s own — by staff attorneys or law clerks — and let out with scant editing by
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pronouncement is combined with security in office, it is all too easy
for the politically insulated officials to lapse into arrogant ipse dixits.”148 This is not to say that EU judges are lazy. They are simply
trying to increase their productivity and spend time on things that
they value more. Indeed, despite their perennial complaint of an
unbearable caseload, EU judges find time to contribute academic
articles in great profusion and keep up a busy schedule of interviews, lectures, speeches, and conferences. Some EU judges work
very hard indeed.149
Because separate opinions are disallowed, dissenting judges
will not be able to exert a credible threat on the majority. This
could lead to the suppression of dissenting opinions. A forceful
dissent points out the inaccuracies and inadequacies in the majority’s opinion, and thus its “foremost and undeniable external consequence” is to undermine the majority’s opinion.150 This puts
pressure on the majority and increases its incentives to “get it
right.” Judge Fidelma Macken from Ireland recalled that one of
her “most awful times” at the Court was when thirteen other judges outvoted her in a case in which she was acting as the rapporteur.151 The case she was dealing with involved some cutting-edge
trademark law issues, and she was the only person “on the Court
of Justice with a very strong intellectual property background.”152
Had Judge Macken been given the right to dissent, the majority
would probably have taken her opinions more seriously. Even if
she was still outvoted, her dissent may still have served an alert
function that would signal to the future court and legislature that
the case could be troubling.
Moreover, because consensus-building is highly valued in orthe supervising panel”).
148 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
149 Judge David Edward, a prolific writer and one of the most highly regarded EU judges, is exemplary in many regards. See Hansen-Ingram, supra note 88, at
3 (describing his secretary’s recollection).
150 Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 19 J. SUP. CT. HISTORY 33, 35 (1994).
151 J. H. H. Weiler & Judge Fidelman Macken, Lecture at the New York University Law School Distinguished Global Fellows Lecture Series: To Be A European Constitutional Court Judge, A Conversation with Judge Fidelman Macken
(Sept. 4, 2003).
152 Id.
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der to produce a single coherent judgment, it exerts pressures on
judges to conform. This could lead to “groupthink,” an undesirable group decision-making phenomenon identified by scholars of
organizational behavior.153 Scholars have found that because people are extremely vulnerable to unanimous opinions, even a single
dissenter is likely to create a huge impact.154 They observe that
corporate boardrooms that encourage dissenting opinions are likely to perform better than those that silence their members.155 One
study shows that the highest-performing companies have extremely contentious boards that regard dissent as an obligation.156
Skeptics note that even if EU judges were given the right to dissent, they would be unlikely to do so, and thus it wouldn’t lead to
a difference in practice anyway.157 Indeed, “dissent aversion” has
been well documented in US appellate judging.158 Writing a dissent requires effort and is costly to the author.159 Dissent also imposes a cost on the majority by requiring the latter to revise its
opinions to address the concerns raised in the dissent.160 Judges do
not like to be criticized,161 and thus dissents tend to fray collegiality
among judges.162 Epstein and her coauthors predict that the more
often judges sit together, the more likely they will be to invest in
See generally IRVING L. JANIS, GROUP THINK (2d ed. 1982) (analyzing information from various scholars and publications on the role of “groupthink” in policy decisions).
154 Id. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003) (arguing that societies and nations are more likely to prosper with a healthy amount
of dissent).
155
Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. BUS. REV.
(Sept.
2002),
https://hbr.org/2002/09/what-makes-great-boards-great
[https://perma.cc/UR4E-ZPDR].
156 Id.
157 See Director General for Internal Policy, supra note 135, at 36 (noting that
dissents would not be mandatory and judges would remain free to continue their
current practices).
158 See generally Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical
and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 103 (2011) (explaining the phenomenon regarding “‘dissent aversion’ which sometimes causes a judge not to
dissent even when he disagrees with the majority opinion”).
159 Id.
160 Id. at 104
161 POSNER, supra note 32, at 32.
162 Epstein, supra note 158, at 104.
153
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collegiality and the less likely they will be to dissent.163 Applied to
the EU context, we would expect more disagreement in a grand
chamber than in a small chamber of three or five judges. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that having the option to dissent is
different from actually exercising that option. When judges are
given the right to dissent, it is equivalent to the right of withdrawal
in a collective enterprise.164 Having the right of withdrawal itself
disciplines free-riders and creates a more credible threat to the majority, who need to consider dissenting opinions more carefully.
Defenders of the single judgment note that the function of advocates general, who issue their own independent opinions for the
Court, was created exactly to compensate for the lack of dissenting
opinion.165 However, the function of the advocates general is an
inferior substitute. Advocates general have no voting power and
do not participate in the deliberation. Their opinions therefore exert less of a threat on the majority. Moreover, advocates general
now participate in a small proportion of cases and are called upon
only in highly complex and difficult cases.166 And because advocates general are appointed early on, the Court may well overlook
some cases that only later turn out to be complex and difficult.167
At the General Court, there is no dedicated member who serves as
an advocate general.168 Sometimes a judge could be appointed as
an advocate general on an ad hoc basis, but it is rare. In the history
of the General Court, there have been only eighteen occasions
where the General Court has appointed an advocate general in

Id.
See Justin Yifu Lin, Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 19591961, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1228, 1240–43 (1990) (arguing that it was the deprivation of
the right to withdraw from a collective in 1958 that led to the agricultural crisis in
1959–1961 in China).
165 Director General for Internal Policy, supra note 135, at 35.
166 Michal Bobek, A Fourth in the Court: Why Are There Advocates General in the
Court of Justice?, 14 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. OF EUR. LEGAL STUD. 529, 535 (2011).
167 See e.g., Case C-179/12P, The Dow Chemical Company v. Commission,
2013 E.C.R. 1, 3 (involving an appeal which asserts that the General Court failed to
properly examine various factors that would have been favorable to the appellant).
168 See Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, supra note 5, at
art. 49 (noting that members may be designated the task of advocate general if
and when needed).
163
164
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competition cases.169 As a consequence, in the vast majority of
competition cases it decided not to reap the supposed benefits of
opinions from the advocates general.
5.1. A Case Study of the Microsoft Split
On September 17, 2007, the General Court upheld the Commission’s decision finding that Microsoft had infringed EU competition law for refusing to supply interoperability information to
competing suppliers of workgroup servers and for illegally tying
Windows Media Player to the Windows PC operating system (“the
Microsoft judgment”).170 The judgment is widely thought to be an
important victory for the Commission, who suffered a series of
setbacks in early 2000 when the General Court quashed a number
of the Commission’s merger decisions.171 It further reinforced the
Commission’s invincible record in abuse of dominance cases. Ever
since the establishment of the Court, few appeals against abuse of
dominance cases brought by the Commission have been won on
substantive grounds.172
The Microsoft judgment, which runs 416 pages in the European
Court Reports, offers a scathing criticism of Microsoft’s arguments
and a strong endorsement of the Commission’s decision.173 It projects the image of a unanimous decision signed by thirteen judges
in the Grand Chamber. For many, the decision “came as something of a surprise.”174 Indeed, when Microsoft requested interim
relief to suspend the Commission’s remedial orders in 2004, Bo
169 I hand-collected this data using the Court’s case search database. InfoCuria, supra note 31.
170 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3619, 4026–28.
171 DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST:
AN EXAMINATION OF US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 35 (2015).
172 See Pablo Ibañez Colomo, The Law on Abuse of Dominance and the System of
Judicial Remedies, 32 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 389, 403 (2013) (identifying only one judgment
where the decision was annulled on substantive grounds since 1992).
173 See Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. at 3878–80 (describing one of many issues on
which the Court quickly rules against Microsoft and dismisses its arguments).
174 HARRY FIRST, STRONG SPINE, WEAK UNDERBELLY: THE CFI MICROSOFT
DECISION, 1 (2007).
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Vesterdorf, then President of the General Court, recognized that
there was a serious dispute on a number of points. Though he
dismissed Microsoft’s request for interim relief, Vesterdorf held
that Microsoft’s other arguments on interoperability and tying issues could not be dismissed “as prima facie unfounded.”175 Why
did the General Court, which appeared to entertain some points of
Microsoft’s defense in 2004, completely demolish them in the later
main action? Answering this question requires unveiling the faces
behind the Microsoft judgment.
In March 2008, Bo Vesterdorf gave a lecture at Queen Mary
School of Law at the University of London on the Microsoft judgment. The lecture was certainly timely, as Vesterdorf had presided
over Microsoft and left the Court only a few months prior.176 It is
common for EU judges to give keynote speeches and participate in
panel discussions at public events. But what was unusual about
Vesterdorf’s speech was his comment at the end of the lecture:
“From a purely academic point of view, it may be regretted that
the judgment was not brought on appeal before the ECJ so Europe’s highest Court could have its final say in the case.”177 This
statement sends a signal that he disagreed with the outcome of the
case. In other words, he was probably outvoted in Microsoft.
His lecture, which was later published in the Queen Mary’s
student law review, offers cautious and subtle criticisms of the Microsoft decision. Understanding this critique requires some context.
Earlier EU competition law precedents had identified a cumulative
four-part test for identifying an abusive refusal to supply on the
part of a dominant firm. The refusal must: (a) relate to a product
or service indispensable to the exercise of a particular activity on a
neighboring market; (b) exclude any effective competition in the
neighboring market; (c) prevent the emergence of a new product
for which there is a potential consumer demand; and (d) have no
objective justification.178 Vesterdorf observed that the General
Id. (italics added).
Bo Vesterdorf, Article 82 EC: Where Do We Stand After the Microsoft Judgment?, GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 1, 14 (2008), http://www.icc.qmul.ac.uk/
docs/gar2008/144723.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MXG-5V9W].
177 Id. at 14.
178 Id. at 4.
175
176
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Court had expanded the scope of each of these conditions in order
to dismiss Microsoft’s claims.
First, he observed that the General Court had deviated from
earlier cases such as Volvo, Magill and IMS Health, and Commercial
Solvent and expanded the concept of “indispensability” to cover
“economic indispensability.”179 He noted that this would make it
easier for the Commission to satisfy its burden of proof in abuse
cases and leave intellectual property holders with more uncertainty as to when its refusal to grant a license could be deemed abusive.180 He further noted that the judicial scrutiny of the Commission’s assessment of what would be deemed “economically viable”
is very limited, given the fact that the Commission enjoys a margin
of appreciation in economically complex assessments.181
With regards to the second requirement, Vesterdorf also noted
a shift from the requirement in case law such as IMS Health and
Magill.182 He observed that the Court had shifted from the elimination of all competition to the elimination only of effective competition, which loosened the condition and again made it easier for the
Commission to satisfy its burden of proof.183
Regarding the third requirement of “new products,” Vesterdorf
found that the Court also expanded the requirement in IMS and
Magill to not only cover “production or markets, but also . . . technical development.”184 As such, “prevention of technical development” could be deemed abusive.185 Further, Vesterdorf expressed
concern that the Court, while dismissing Microsoft’s objective justification for refusing to deal, left open the question of how the burden of proof could be satisfied by the dominant undertaking.186

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. at 6–7.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
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The second issue in Microsoft deals with whether the Windows
operating system and Media Player are two separate products and
Microsoft had illegally tied the two products together in violation
of EU competition law.187 Again, Vesterdorf expressed sympathy
with Microsoft’s arguments that the packaging of Windows with
the Media Player had not prevented PC manufacturers from selling
a package that contained other media players and that buyers were
also free to add other media players into their PC.188
Concluding the lecture, Vesterdorf expressed concern about the
“far reaching consequences” of the Microsoft decision.189 He observed that the case expanded the power of the Commission and
the national authorities in pursuing dominant firms, and this might
have “negative consequences for holders of IPRs” by discouraging
their incentives to innovate.190 In regards to the tying claim, he reminded readers that “overstretching the concept of tying can become a serious constraint for what otherwise would be valuable
development and innovation to the benefit of consumers.”191
The Microsoft case offers a textbook example of how the collegial decision-making process in fact suppresses dissent and creates
the illusion of a single, unanimous decision. Had the Microsoft case
allowed dissent, it would have sent a signal to the Court of Justice
that there was in fact fierce disagreement among the members of
the panel. However, the final decision was crafted as a strong endorsement of the Commission’s decision exactly to avoid communicating any such signal to the higher court.
6. THE ASYMMETRIC JURISDICTION
Judges derive power from judicial activity. In the opinion of
many serving at the Court, the success of the Court was built in its
early days when it acted with “courage, foresight and imagination”
187
188
189
190
191

Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3619, 3866–67.
Vesterdorf, supra note 176, at 10–13.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
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in “constitutionalizing” the Community.192 EU judges are nostalgic
about the Court’s “glorious past,” as evidenced by the proliferation
of their celebration of the Court’s achievements in law journals and
magazines.193 But their exercise of judicial power faces an important constraint: the jurisdictional competence of the Court.
Due to its hierarchical structure and the implicit hierarchy among
different cases, the division of labor between the General Court
and the Court of Justice could lead to divergent incentives for
judges working at different levels of the Court.
6.1. The Aversion to Appeals
At the Court of Justice, a large bulk of the work is handling
preliminary references, which are questions referred from the national courts of the EU Member States. As shown in Table 5 below,
49% of cases handled by the Court of Justice from 2005 to 2014 are
preliminary reference. In preliminary reference proceedings, the
role of the Court is to give the ultimate interpretation of EU law
and ensure uniformity in its application.194 Many political scientists have attributed the Court’s success to the preliminary reference proceedings. By engaging with individual litigants and national courts, preliminary references were the main mechanism
through which the Court could expand the EU legal order and advance the goal of European integration.195 Preliminary reference is
192 See Giuseppe Federico Mancini & David T. Keeling, Democracy and the European Court of Justice, 57 MOD. L. REV. 175, 182 (1994) (noting the Court’s achievements despite the inherent and built-in weaknesses of the procedure).
193 See Harm Schepel & Rein Wesseling, The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers,
Officials and Clerks in the Writing of Europe, 3 EUR. L. J. 165, 178–79 (1997) (arguing
that the structure and community of EU lawyers played a significant impact in the
development of the law).
194 See Edward, supra note 18, at 544–45 (describing the courts’ role in references to determine the nature of EU law that national courts will apply and that
will be applicable throughout the European Community).
195 See Walter Mattli & Ann-Marie Slaughter, Revisiting the European Court of
Justice, 52 Int’l Org. 177, 200 (1998) (finding that national courts were relatively
accepting of the direct effect and supremacy of EU law). See also Karen J. Alter,
Who are the “Masters of the Treaty”?: European Governments and the European Court of
Justice, 52 INT’L ORG. 121, 126 (1998) (showing that the ECJ intentionally encourages national courts to set aside incompatible national policies by using the pre-
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therefore regarded as “the jewel in the crown” in the jurisdictional
competence of the Court of Justice,196 and many, if not most, of the
Court’s most audacious and groundbreaking decisions are preliminary rulings. As revealed in Table 5 below, during the period
from 2005 to 2014, 60% of the cases handled by the grand chamber
and the full court were preliminary reference proceedings, a higher
percentage than the portion (49%) among all cases. This suggests
that, in general, a preliminary reference carries more weight than
other types of proceedings.
Table 5: Preliminary Reference v. Appeals by Court of Justice
(2005-2014)197
All Cases
Appeals
19%

Preliminary
Reference
49%

Grand Chambers and Full
Court cases
Appeals
Preliminary
Reference
14%
60%

In comparison, appeals follow a form of adversarial procedure
where the Court only rules on the questions and issues the parties
have decided to litigate.198 Because an appeal is a lawsuit against a
jurisdictional act—i.e., the judgment of the General Court—its procedure is subject to many constraints and must be handled with
great caution and precision. Moreover, appeals are much more effort-intensive compared with preliminary references and are generally very time-consuming.199 The Court has to meticulously examine the judgment of the General Court and to thoroughly
review the various written submissions in order to determine
whether the lower court ignored any pleas from the parties. In
liminary ruling mechanism (Article 177) to indicate in its decisions whether or not
certain types of national law would be in compliance with EC law).
196 PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 263 (2d ed., 2012).
197 This data is hand-collected using the Court’s database. InfoCuria, supra
note 31.
198 Edward, supra note 18, at 543.
199 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (April 29, 2015) (notes on
file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Feb. 19,
2015) (notes on file with Author).
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contrast, during preliminary reference proceedings the Court of
Justice is required only to interpret the law; it does not step into the
shoes of the national court to rule on the merits of the case. While
appeals demand higher efforts than preliminary reference proceedings, they carry less weight and play a less central role in enhancing the authority and legitimacy of the Court. As shown in Table
5, only 14% of grand chamber and full court decisions are appeals,
a lower percentage than the portion (19%) among all cases. This
shows that, in general, appeals carry less weight than other types
of proceedings, particularly compared to preliminary reference
proceedings.
Meanwhile, the vast majority of the competition cases handled
by the Court of Justice are appeals—see Table 6 below. Compared
with other cases the Court handles, competition appeals have lower visibility and rarely capture media attention. From 2005 to 2014,
over 52%200 of all competition law appeals concerned the calculation of fines in cartel cases. For those yearning for power, the calculation of cartel fines is probably among the least exciting cases
that will push the frontiers of EU law. Indeed, in these cases, the
parties usually admitted their wrong-doing and only contested the
Commission’s calculation of fines. At the same time, these cases
are also very effort-intensive. As a consequence, there is an aversion among members and staff at the higher court in handling such
appeals.201 As members and staff of the Court of Justice do not
want their dockets flooded with appeals from the General Court,
they are likely to be less inclined to annul the Commission’s decisions. The situation is different when it comes to preliminary reference proceedings, which generally concern novel and difficult
questions that the national courts were not able to resolve. In those
occasions, judges and référendaires have the freedom to reformulate the questions they would seek to answer. An insider suggests
that this explains why the Court appears much more receptive to
economic analysis and provides more reasoned analysis when
200

note 31.

This data is hand-collected using the Court’s database. InfoCuria, supra

201 Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (April 29, 2015) (notes on
file with Author); Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Feb. 19,
2015) (notes on file with Author).
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dealing with competition law cases in preliminary reference proceedings than in appeals.202
Table 6: Competition Cases Decided by the Court of Justice
(2005 to 2014)203
All Competition Cases
Appeals
74%

Preliminary
Reference
24%

Grand Chambers and Full
Court Competition Cases
Appeals
Preliminary
Reference
73%
27%

6.2. The Dilemma of the Lower Court
Compared with the Court of Justice, the General Court is more
specialized and has a narrower scope of jurisdiction. The General
Court was set up in 1989 to reduce the workload of the Court of
Justice in dealing with competition and staff cases and to search
more deeply into case facts.204 While the jurisdictional scope of the
General Court has expanded over the years, it has not dealt with
preliminary reference cases.205 Unlike the situation at the higher
court, competition occupies a more central role among its case
202 Interview with Former Référendaire, in London, Eng. (Feb. 19, 2015)
(notes on file with Author).
203
This data is hand-collected using the Court’s database. InfoCuria, supra
note 31.
204 Memorandum by the CBI to the U.K. House of Lords, in HOUSE OF LORDS,
EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, JUSTICE AND INSTITUTIONS SUB-COMMITTEE, INQUIRY
INTO THE WORKLOAD OF THE WORKLOAD OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WRITTEN
EVIDENCE
7,
10
(2010),
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/lordscommittees/eu-sub-com-e/CourtofJustice/euewrittenevidence.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SB9M-XGHL] (U.K.). See also Council Decision 88/591/ECSC,
Establishing a Court of First Instance of the European Communities, art. 1, 1988
O.J. (L 319) 1, 1 (establishing the General Court).
205 The Nice Treaty expressly provides for the possible transfer of certain preliminary ruling cases to the General Court, leaving its implementation to the discretion of the Court of Justice. See Nicolas Forwood, The Court of First Instance, Its
Development, and Future Role in Legal Architecture of the European Union, in
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN EU LAW: ARTICLES IN HONOR OF SIR FRANCIS JACOB 34,
40 (Anthony Arnull et al. eds., 2008) (“[T]he Treaty provided expressly, for the
first time, for the possible transfer to the CFI of competence in certain preliminary
cases, such a transfer again being limited to ‘specific areas’ of Community law”).
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portfolio. As Judge Forwood once put it: “for some Judges of the
CFI [now the General Court] at least, [competition] has been their
primary raison d'être.”206
This has to do with the jurisdictional scope of the General
Court, which generally deals with fact-intensive cases that are
largely standard and routine. Therefore, competition cases are
generally regarded as “more interesting and visible” compared to
other categories of cases.207 It also has to do with the Court's human capital. The General Court is an attractive workplace for
judges and référendaires with a competition law background, as it
handles many more competition cases than the higher court. Interviewees indicate that judges and référendaires who are interested in competition law tend to be more engaged with economic
analysis and in-depth scrutiny of the Commission’s assessment.208
However, because the General Court is bound by the rulings of the
Court of Justice, it operates within a tight straightjacket. While in
principle the General Court does not need to adhere to the rulings
by the Court of Justice, in practice there is pressure on it to do so
because its decisions could be subject to appeal.209 Moreover, the
General Court frequently refers to the judgments of the Court of
Justice as a basis for its reasoning, thus reinforcing its subordination to the higher court.210 In fact, were the General Court to deviate from the higher court’s ruling, it would undermine the authority of the Court of Justice before the national courts.
Not surprisingly, when some judges at the General Court attempted to conduct more intense scrutiny of the Commission’s
economic analysis, the Court of Justice reminded it that it lacks the
power to do so.211 As explained by Mark Jaeger, the President of
Id. at 44.
Telephone Interview with Former Référendaire (April 29, 2015) (notes on
file with Author).
208 Id.
209 Takis Tridimas, Precedent and the Court of Justice: A Jurisprudence of Doubt?,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 307, 307 n.4 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012); Marc van der Woude, The Court of First Instance, the First Three Years, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 412, 459–60 (1992) (stating that
the possibility of appeal renders the CFI practically deferential to ECJ decisions).
210 Woude, supra note 209, at 459.
211 Mark Jaeger, The Standard of Review in Competition Cases Involving Complex
206
207
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the General Court, when defending the General Court’s “deferential approach . . . [, i]f the General Court’s message as to its willingness to review the Commission’s assessments of complex economic matters through an intense—though marginal—review
seems to be clear, the intervention of the Court of Justice may,
however, confuse the issue in the eyes of interested observers.”212
He then went on to note three instances in which the General Court
attempted to apply more intense scrutiny to the Commission’s
economic analysis.213 For instance, in Impala, decided in 2006, the
General Court criticized the Commission for its failure to verify the
accuracy and relevance of the data submitted by the parties, especially in light of the fact that the data contradicted the information
the Commission gathered during its market investigation.214 In
GlaxoSmithKlein, the General Court abandoned the per se approach
in analyzing vertical restraint cases and conducted a deeper assessment of the economic effects of the agreement in question.215
In Alrosa, the General Court conducted close scrutiny of the various commitments offered by the parties to settle their case with the
Commission and annulled the Commission’s decision for infringement of the principle of proportionality.216
All these attempts, however, failed, and in each case the General Court was scolded by the Court of Justice for overstepping the
confined boundary of a marginal review of the Commission’s
“complex economic assessment.”217 As a result, the General Court
needs to tread a very fine line between (in the words of Judge Jaeger): “intense control of all elements on which the Commission relied leading to its appraisal—especially those expressed in the
judgment of the General Court and . . . recognition of a certain discretion on the part of the Commission in recalling that marginal
review prevents judges substituting their own appreciation to the
decision-makers—as brought out in some recent judgments by the
Economic Assessment: Towards the Marginalisation of the Marginal Review, 2 J. EUR.
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 295, 303–05 (2011).
212 Id. at 303.
213 Id. at 303–05.
214
Id. at 303.
215 Id. at 303–04.
216 Id. at 304.
217 Id.
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Court of Justice.”218 The Court of Justice, on the other hand, is in a
position to innovate and overrule those outdated precedents. But
many judges and référendaires there lack the incentives to do so
due to their aversion to competition law appeals. As a consequence, lowering the intensity of judicial oversight in these cases
could be an indirect way to limit competition appeals.219 This
unique institutional design of the Court therefore leads to a very
unfortunate outcome: those who want to innovate lack the power
to do so, whereas those with the power lack the incentive.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Political scientists and legal scholars who study the Court tend
to view it as a unitary entity.220 They build their study upon an assumption that the Court has a single, coherent objective to achieve
the political goal of integrating Europe. Instead of viewing the
Court as a whole, this Article considers the individuals who comprise it. It examines the selection process, career structures and incentives of the EU judges and their référendaires, as well as the
Court’s decision-making process, and investigates how these can
influence judicial behavior. It has several major findings.
First, the Article finds that the Court's high judicial salaries and
lack of procedural safeguards for EU judicial appointments attract
political appointees. As a consequence, some judges who are selected are not competent to perform their duties and are dominated by their référendaires. Moreover, the uncertainty inherent to
judicial re-appointment and the high turnover rate of EU judges
hampers their productivity, and increases their dependence on the
référendaires. Meanwhile, référendaires are drawn from a relativeId. at 305.
Craig observed that this technique of limiting caseload has also been applied to preliminary reference proceedings. See Craig, supra note 196, at 267 (discussing the technique of indirectly limiting case load by limiting the intensity of
judicial oversight).
220 See generally ALTER supra note 2 (describing the Court’s political influence
as a collective unit); A LEC STONE SWEET , THE J UDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF E UROPE
(2004) (analyzing the many roles the European Court has played, but considering
it a single unit in its role).
218
219
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ly closed social network due to the lack of an open platform for recruitment and the requirement of French as the working language.
The inefficiency of the référendaire labor market results in less
competition, leading many référendaires to stay longer at the
Court. The longevity of career référendaires also gives them tremendous power; some of these référendaires become conservative
forces that resist changes and reform. The revolving door between
the Court and the Commission raises serious conflict issues, as the
Commission was able to exert influence on the Court from the inside and gain a comparative advantage in litigation. Moreover, the
Court’s practice of issuing a single, collegial decision encourages
free-riding and increases pressures for judges and référendaires to
conform and suppresses dissent, as illustrated in the Microsoft case.
Last but not least, the division of labor between the lower court
and the higher court creates divergent incentive structures for
judges and référendaires working at different levels.
Achieving a sound understanding of the Court is key to legal
reform. The current EU proposal to reform the Court, which focuses primarily on increasing the number of judges in order to reduce backlog,221 misses the bigger picture. This Article points to
three critical aspects in need of reform.
First, instead of continuing the current fragmented approach to
nominating EU judges, the EU needs a unified policy for judicial
appointment. The Committee established under Article 255 TFEU
is a promising step, but its power is limited and is inadequate to
address concerns over judicial quality. Meanwhile, more careful
consideration should be given to the optimal structure of judicial
careers (e.g., compensation, tenure, exit options), which directly influences selection into the judiciary and the behavior of judges.
For instance, overpaying judges could increase the risks of political
interference during appointment. Moreover, the six-year term for
EU judges is too short and severely reduces their productivity. A
longer, non-renewable tenure, would increase judge productivity
221 See Press Release of the Council of the European Union, Q&A on the Reform of the General Court (June 23, 2015), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2015/06/23-questions-answers-general-court/
[https://perma.cc/XKG3-P8GL] (stating that the General Court will double its
number of judges in a few years).
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while allowing greater independence. Judges would then have the
freedom to dissent, which would provide them with the necessary
incentives to exert effort to improve the quality of opinions.
Second, the Court should reconsider the use of the French language as a working language. One oft-cited reason to preserve the
French language is to reduce administrative cost.222 But this argument overlooks the impact of the French language on judicial decision-makers. The difficulty of the French language has prohibited
many EU countries from finding suitable candidates to serve at the
Court. Equally important, but often ignored, is that French also artificially reduces the size of the labor market for référendaires, resulting in an outcome wherein Francophones have a disproportionate influence on shaping EU law. English is the obvious
alternative. As a foreign language English is much more widely
spoken than French in Europe223 and it has functioned well as the
official language in other EU institutions such as the Commission.
The recruitment, management, and governance of référendaires should command more attention from EU policymakers.
Establishing an official online platform for recruiting référendaires
will increase the efficiency for both the application and hiring processes. In addition, an adequate mechanism should be created to
address any potential concern of a revolving door between the
Court and other public and private institutions. The secondment
program from the Commission to the Court raises serious conflict
issues, and it is questionable whether such a scheme should be allowed to continue. Considering that many référendaires serve
longer than their judges, it is well worth considering whether the
tenure of référendaires should be capped, as otherwise they risk
exerting a powerful conservative force upon the Court and dominating less experienced judges.

222 See Schiemann, supra note 84, at 10–11 (noting the difficulty in finding
English-speaking supporting staff to serve at the Court, especially considering the
Court is located in a French-speaking country).
223 See Eur. Comm’n, supra note 83, at 5 (showing English is the most widely
spoken language in the EU (38%) and far exceeding French (12%)).
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Appendix I

Background Information of Judges and
Advocates General
GC
Judge

CJ
Judge

184
0.892
0.346
0.227

66
0.831
0.508
0.277

95
0.917
0.302
0.188

45
0.911
0.244
0.178

0.416
0.619
0.335

0.385
0.600
0.415

0.469
0.630
0.313

0.311
0.733
0.333

0.108

0.182

0.052

0.111

0.135
0.535
0.654

0.000
0.508
0.569

0.063
0.552
0.667

0.133
0.467
0.756

0.070

0.108

0.042

0.089

0.281
0.276
0.173
0.108
0.162
0.270
0.189
0.286
0.070
0.184

0.215
0.262
0.231
0.123
0.169
0.262
0.154
0.292
0.138
0.154

0.292
0.313
0.156
0.094
0.146
0.271
0.240
0.281
0.021
0.188

0.289
0.244
0.089
0.067
0.311
0.222
0.178
0.222
0.089
0.289

Total
Count
Gender (M=1, F = 0)
Current Member
Complete Education Information
Education (PHD 1, non-PHD 0)
Previous
Academia
Experience Private
Practice
Référendaire at
the Court
CJEU
National Court
National
Government
European
Commission
Primary
Government
Prior
Academia
Work
Judiciary
Experience
Private Practice
Unknown
Last Posi- Government
tion
Academia
Judiciary
Private Practice
Unknown
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Notes
1. This table provides the summary statistics of the background
information of current and former judges and advocates general
(both referred to as EU judges) at the General Court and the
Court of Justice. It does not provide information on the judges at
the Civil Service Tribunal (CST). The information was coded
from the court’s website.224
2. “Count” indicates the number of valid data points.
3. GC=General Court; CJ=Court of Justice; AG=Advocate General; Court = GC+CJ; “CJEU” =GC+CJ+CST.
4. “Complete education experience” means that the schools and
the degrees received by the EU judge are both specified in his
public profile.
5. “Previous experience” refers to an EU judge's prior working
experience before joining the Court. The vast majority of EU
judges have varied experience.
6. “Primary prior work experience” refers to the longest job experience of an EU judge prior to joining the Court. For instance, if a
judge worked for ten years as a judge at a national court and five
years as an academic prior to joining the Court, his primary prior
work experience is judiciary.
7. “Last position” refers to the last position immediately before
the EU judge joins the Court.

InfoCuria, Court of Justice, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
jcms/p1_217426/en/ [https://perma.cc/BX29-LXFU] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016);
InfoCuria, General Court, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_217427/
en/ [https://perma.cc/X8AS-VD5S] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016); InfoCuria, Presentation of the Members, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/en/
[https://perma.cc/3P6C-SG2Z] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016).
224
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Appendix II

Average
Median
Std Dev
Min
Max

[Vol. 38:1

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

Tenure of Former Judges and Advocates
General (in years)
GC Judge
8.243
7
4.136
2
18

CJ Judge
8.985
8
4.310
0
21

AG
7.278
6
4.286
2
20

Notes:
1. This table provides the summary statistics of the tenure of the
former EU judges at the General Court and the Court of Justice.
The information was coded from the court’s website.225
2. GC=General Court; CJ=Court of Justice; AG=Advocate General.

225 InfoCuria,
Court of Justice, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
jcms/p1_217426/en/ [https://perma.cc/BX29-LXFU] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016);
InfoCuria, General Court, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/p1_217427/
en/ [https://perma.cc/X8AS-VD5S] (last visited Oct. 15, 2016); InfoCuria, Presentation of the Members, CURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/en/
[https://perma.cc/3P6C-SG2Z]
(last
visited
Oct.
15,
2016).
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226

Basic Background Information of a Sample of
Current and Former Référendaires. 226

Supra note 89–90 and accompanying text.
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Appendix IV
Tenure and Work Experience of a Sample of
Current and Former Référendaires.227
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The Revolving Door Between the Commission
and the Court.228

